Conquering Climate Change

By Dennis M. Bushnell

Carbon-dioxide levels are now greater than at any time in the past 650,000 years, according to data gathered from examining ice cores. These increases in CO2 correspond to estimates of man-made uses of fossil carbon fuels such as coal, petroleum, and natural gas. The global climate computations, as reported by the ongoing Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) studies, indicate that such man-made CO2 sources could be responsible for observed climate changes such as temperature increases, loss of ice coverage, and ocean acidification. Admittedly, the less than satisfactory state of knowledge regarding the effects of aerosol and other issues make the global climate computations less than fully accurate, but we must take this issue very seriously.

I believe we should act in accordance with the precautionary principle: When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures become obligatory, even if some cause-and-effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.

As paleontologist Peter Ward discussed in his book Under a Green Sky, several “warming events” have radically altered the life on this planet throughout geologic history. Among the most significant of these was the Permian extinction, which took place some 250 million years ago. This event resulted in a decimation of animal life, leading many scientists to refer to it as the Great Dying. The Permian extinction is thought to have been caused by a sudden increase in CO2 from Siberian volcanoes. The amount of CO2 we’re releasing into the atmosphere today, through human activity, is 100 times greater than what came out of those volcanoes.

During the Permian extinction, a number of chain-reaction events, or “positive feedbacks,” resulted in oxygen-depleted oceans, enabling overgrowth of certain bacteria, producing copious amounts of hydrogen sulfide, making the atmosphere toxic, and decimating the ozone layer, all producing species die-off. The positive feedbacks not yet fully included in the IPCC projections include the release of the massive amounts of fossil methane, some 20 times worse than CO2 as an accelerator of warming, fossil CO2 from the tundra and oceans, reduced oceanic CO2 uptake due to higher temperatures, acidification and algae changes, changes in the earth’s ability to reflect the sun’s light back into space due to loss of glacier ice, changes in land use, and extensive water evaporation (a greenhouse gas) from temperature increases.

The additional effects of these feedbacks increase the projections from a 4°C–6°C temperature rise by 2100 to a 10°C–12°C rise, according to some estimates. At those temperatures, beyond 2100, essentially all the ice would melt and the ocean would rise by as much as 75 meters, flooding the homes of one-third of the global population.

Between now and then, ocean methane hydrate release could cause major tidal waves, and glacier melting could affect major rivers upon which a large percentage of the population depends. We’ll see increases in flooding, storms, disease, droughts, species extinctions, ocean acidification, and a litany of other impacts, all as a consequence of man-made climate change. Arctic ice melting, CO2 increases, and ocean warming are all occurring much faster than previous IPCC forecasts, so, as dire as the forecasts sound, they’re actually conservative.

These threats exist in addition to the documented economic, geopolitical, and national-security issues associated with the continued use of fossil fuels. The finite nature of coal, oil, and natural gas will instigate higher energy prices and greater energy price disruptions. According to some credible estimates, the world will realize “peak” oil fuel availability before 2015, peak uranium around 2025, peak natural gas around 2035, and peak coal around 2050. Because of these climatic, economic, national-security, and geopolitical drivers, it makes sense to alter our energy sources and uses in an expeditious manner.

Conquering Climate Change

The world currently derives 300 exajoules (83 million gigawatt hours) of energy from fossil fuel use each year. The major renewables — such as biomass, drilled or hot rock geothermal, solar thermal, solar photovolatics, and wind — could yield 4,000 exajoules per year each. In my previous article for THE FUTURIST magazine, I touched on the potential of genetically engineered saltwater algae, and I would reiterate my enthusiasm for that solution here.

There are several other intriguing renewable alternatives, such as a number of wind-energy systems that merit more research. These include not only terrestrial, or even offshore wind projects, but also high-altitude wind-energy farming. Estimates of the high-altitude wind capacity off the East Coast indicate the presence of enough potential energy to meet U.S. electrical grid requirements.

Researchers are also considering several unconventional sources of heated water with huge potential capacity. These include harnessing the waste water sitting in deep oil wells that’s been geothermally heated and tapping the Gulf Stream off the U.S. East Coast. Researchers at MIT have documented the potentials of drilled or hot rock geothermal energy.

Oceanic thermal energy conversion (OTEC) uses the temperature differences in the ocean to run turbines and produce energy. In tropical climates, the surface of the water, continually exposed to the sun, can reach temperatures of 80°F. Some 3,000 feet below the surface, the temperature descends to 40°F. This temperature difference, harnessed correctly, is enough to drive generators. New research suggests that descending to depths of 3,000 feet and lower may not even be necessary, as very cold water actually runs alongside the Gulf Stream and can be tapped horizontally. Studies from the University of Massachusetts suggest that this type of OTEC could produce sufficient energy to power the U.S. electrical grid.

These are among the more exotic solutions, but simple conservation could reduce overall energy use by 30%. In the United States alone, some 200,000 homes are off the electrical grid. The technology for this type of distributed power generation, where individuals are much less beholden to utility companies, is developing rapidly. Tomorrow’s off-the-grid pioneers will use next-generation photovoltaic panels, windmills, solar thermal, passive solar, thermoelectrics, and bioreactors, which convert sewage, yard waste, and kitchen scraps into fuels.

Nuclear power could play a larger role if we were able to go to nuclear reactors that generate more fissile material than they use (also called breeders) and switch from uranium to thorium, which is three times as abundant but otherwise is probably not a major portion of the energetics solution space. Renewables remain the less-costly option.

Skeptics such as former U.S. Energy Secretary James Schlesinger have raised concerns about the difficulty of storing energy from renewable sources, as opposed to oil or coal. But geothermal energy and biomass produce power continuously, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Wind, photovoltaics, and solar thermal power plants are, of course, cyclical — when there’s no wind or light, there’s no power — but storage options are increasing daily. Future batteries will take advantage of new technologies that will make them orders of magnitude more efficient than today’s chemical battery options. Researchers at Sandia National Labs are already researching the practicality of batteries using ultracapacitors and superconducting magnetic energy storage with carbon nanotube magnets. Low-energy nuclear reactors (LENRs), otherwise known as cold fusion reactors, were considered impossible to build a decade ago but are gaining attention thanks to the work of Allan Widom and Lewis Larsen, who have proposed a new theory to explain how LENR might work. NASA is conducting experiments in an attempt to verify their theory, which explains the decades-long LENR experiments as products of quantum weak interaction theory applied to condensed matter, not fusion.

The footprint of human civilization on this planet is now so large, covering so much geographical area, that we can even have a meaningful effect on climate change simply by painting our roofs and roads white to reflect more sunlight back into space.

The costs of fossil carbon fuels are increasing, and this trend will accelerate due to potential “carbon taxes,” but mostly due to worsening shortages. The costs for the renewables have been dropping for years. Many, such as certain biofuels, are already economically competitive with fossil fuels, and all renewables are projected to be as cheap as oil and even coal within some 10 to 15 years or sooner. If governments mandate that power companies who run coal-fired plants sequester their waste CO2, the costs of coal use will go up, hastening its inevitable replacement.

If, by the year 2020, we’ve passed a critical climate tipping point and guaranteed future generations a much more difficult future, it won’t be because of a lack of available solutions today. It’s not technology, capacity, or costs per se that are slowing humanity’s move to renewables, but rather conservatism, our attachment to the industries and strategies we’ve already invested money in (sunk costs), and lack of creative strategic planning for the inevitable demise of fossil fuels.

About the Author

Dennis Bushnell is the chief scientist at the NASA Langley Research Center in Hampton, Virginia, and a speaker at the World Future Society’s conference in Boston this July. His previous article for THE FUTURIST, “Algae: A Panacea Crop?” was published in March-April 2009. Web site www.nasa.gov/centers/
langley/home/index.html.

The Potential and Risks of Geoengineering

By Jamais Cascio

When it comes to our planet’s environment, “isolationism” is impossible. By the year 2030, environmental policy and political policy will be completely inseparable at the global level. Arguably, that should be the case today. As we gain a deeper understanding of ecosystem processes, we’re seeing how actions on one side of the world can dramatically change the lives of people on the other. Interconnectedness is a challenge we can’t run away from.

By 2030, though, the connection between politics and the environment could show up in two very different ways: as a catalyst for war, or as a new model for handling complexity.

The Complexity of Environmental Challenges,
The Challenge of Complexity

Global delays in reducing carbon emissions will likely force the human race to embark upon a set of geoengineering-based responses, not as the complete solution, but simply as a disaster-avoidance measure.

Geoengineering, the deliberate manipulation of the earth’s natural systems, may include various forms of thermal management, such as stratospheric sulfate injections or high-altitude seawater sprays, and might also embrace some form of carbon capture via ocean fertilization, or even something not yet fully described. The mid-2010s is the probable starting period for these strategies, in my view. Geoengineering advocates may see the mid-2010s as already too late, while opponents would likely want more time to study their models.

Once we start down the geoengineering path, we’ll see that talking about it is much simpler than doing it. The unexpected feedbacks and unintended consequences would quickly become manifest, and the reactions could be volatile. Planetary management could become a political flashpoint, leading to outbreaks of violence, especially if different regions have divergent results or demand incompatible outcomes. A good portion of international diplomacy would focus on just how to control climate engineering technologies and deal with their consequences.

Ours will be a challenging world to navigate in the next couple of decades, and not just because of conflicts over who’s in charge or who’s to blame for which problems. We’ll be dealing with multiple complex global system breakdowns — from the ongoing financial system crisis, peak oil production, climate disruption, and the very real possibility of food system collapse. These crises demand greater information analysis, longer-term thinking, and more accountability than traditional forms of global politics have tended to offer. For centuries, nations have been ready to commit “hard power,” military force, when necessary to push their interests. In the twentieth century, nations recognized the value of “soft power,” cultural influence, as a way of gaining allies. But these multifaceted system problems don’t lend themselves to either the hard or soft power approach. They call out a need for a new model to meet the needs of the new century.

It’s hard to exaggerate the sheer complexity of the situation. If the great obstacle to our continued survival and prosperity as a species were “just” global warming, achieving success would be tricky but doable. The challenge we face is global warming plus resource collapse plus pandemic disease plus post-hegemonic disorder plus the myriad other issues.

Nonetheless, there are reasons for optimism.

Solutions to Complex Challenges

We know what we need to do to mitigate climate change, and we have the necessary technology. What we’re missing, more than anything else, is the political will. But politics and society can change — we’ve seen it happen before. It might take a generational shift, it might take a disaster (or three), or it might just come from an expanding understanding of what we’re doing to the planet. It will take a lot of people working on fixes and solutions and ideas — not simply top-down mandates, but massively multi-participant quests, across thousands of communities and hundreds of countries, bringing in literally millions of minds. The very description reeks of innovation potential.

• Innovation in energy. A mix of nuclear, wind, solar, and a few others, such as ocean thermal energy conversion and hydrokinetic power, will overtake fossil fuels by the 2020s, even if China and India retain coal-fired power plants. If handled poorly, such recalcitrance may end up being a driver for significant global tension. If handled well, it could be an engine for new markets and development.

• Innovation in urbanization. More than half the planet lives in cities today, and that proportion is increasing quickly. Sensor dust, embedded computing, augmented reality, and a host of other emerging technologies hold the potential to “awaken” cities as smart environments. But “smart city” has to mean more than just lots of urbanites knowing their own carbon footprint; it must come to refer to a far better understanding of what can be done to improve things.

• Innovation in materials and manufacturing. By the year 2030, molecular fabrication (“nanofactories”) will significantly boost the world’s productive capacities. Although nanofactories have the potential to pose another complex system problem, the kinds of political institutions and models we’ll be forced to develop in response to ongoing environmental crises can serve as platforms for handling issues such as this one. If we can handle the political and social complexities of global warming (and likely geoengineering) in the 2010s and 2020s, we’ll be well-positioned to handle potentially even more disruptive events as the century continues.

Then the Singularity happens in 2048 and we’re all uploaded by force.

I’m kidding about that last one.

I think.

About the Author

Jamais Cascio is a writer, futurist, and ethicist based in the San Francisco Bay Area. He specializes in design strategies and possible outcomes for future scenarios. Cascio has written for the The Atlantic and The Wall Street Journal, and is the author of Hacking the Earth: Understanding the Consequences of Geoengineering (Lulu.com, 2009). He was one of Foreign Policy magazine’s “Top 100 Global Thinkers” for 2009.

Supporting Democracy By Standing Firm

The Futurist Interviews American Enterprise Institute scholar Michael Rubin

THE FUTURIST: What do you see as the best strategy the U.S. might employ to further the cause of human rights in Iran?

Rubin: First and foremost, the White House should use its bully pulpit. After this past summer’s election protests erupted, the Obama administration muted its response, fearing that to throw support to the protestors might taint them. This is a valid concern, but there is no reason why the White House and the State Department can’t speak up for broad principles, such as democracy, justice, free speech, and free association.

After the Berlin Wall fell, we discovered that Presidential rhetoric meant more to dissidents than we ever imagined. There’s a tendency today to want to address human rights issues silently, but discreet diplomatic inquiries are rarely as effective as public support. Regimes prefer to murder in silence; when a dissident becomes a public symbol, not only does the cost associated with a dissident’s imprisonment or murder increase, but the dissident’s story can be a driving force in mobilizing public pressure, as it humanizes the abstract. We saw this in 1999, when Ahmad Batebi became a symbol of the student uprising when he appeared on the cover of the Economist holding a bloody shirt, and 16-year-old Neda, shot in the street by the paramilitary Basij, became a symbol of the situation in Iran in 2009.

The U.S. government should take care against bestowing undue legitimacy upon the regime. When Iranians are taking to the streets in protest against not only the legitimacy of their post-election government, but also their system of government, the White House’s reference to the Islamic Republic of Iran implies endorsement of the theocracy, and their efforts to engage a government which the Iranian electorate does not support also implies recognition. Instead, the White House and State Department might direct their comments to the Iranian public in general and, if necessary, simply refer to the ‘Iranian government’ or the ‘regime,’ as every president—whether Democrat or Republican—did until President Obama changed the formula.

Most controversially, it is important for the U.S. government to consider aid and assistance to Iranian civil society and independent media. For example, the State Department working through non-governmental intermediaries might assist programs which seek to document Iranian human rights abuses or help independent trade unions organize. Fears that U.S. funding might undercut the opposition and strengthen the regime are real, but misplaced. Opponents of civil society support argue that the presence of funding enables the Iranian government to taint all civil society work. The problem with this perspective, however, is that the Iranian regime always accuses its opponents of foreign connections regardless of U.S. action, so supporting civil society would not appreciably alter Iranian behavior. If fear of Iranian rhetoric toward its own internal opposition were to shape U.S. policy, then we’d also have to rule out dialogue, since Iranian security forces have taken to toward accusing any Iranian who engages with American institutions—Yale University and the Carnegie Endowment, for example—of treason.

THE FUTURIST: What about in China, where the attendant economic risks from the Chinese sale of U.S. Treasuries are much greater?

Michael Rubin: U.S. support for human rights and free speech might antagonize the Chinese government a bit, but the chance that Beijing would respond in this fashion is slight to none. It’s simply not in the interest of the Chinese government to sabotage the United States economy to that extent given the level of U.S.-Chinese trade. At the same time, turning a blind eye toward abuses in China also has some inherent, even if indirect, risk. The Chinese government has no incentive to reform and to correct government abuses against its citizenry. Economic disparities run deep from coast into heartland. Absent an outlet for dissent and a system which forces the government to be accountable to the people, there is an inherent risk of wildfire outbreaks of instability in China. Certainly, gentle U.S. prodding for democratization in China is in both our countries long-term interests.

THE FUTURIST: Do you see the Iranian regime persisting in its present state until the year 2020? What might happen when it fades from existence?

Michael Rubin: If we take a snapshot of Iranian demography, it might look like the Islamic Republic is in trouble. The Iranian economy is stagnant, living standards are declining, and the regime can’t provide enough work for young people finishing the university. Time is, unfortunately, working in the regime’s favor. In the years immediately after the Islamic Revolution and Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini encouraged large families. The regime put up posters showing ‘a good Islamic family’ with a mother, a father, and six children. After the Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988, the Iranian government realized that it could not handle such a large population. Suddenly posters appeared depicting ‘a good Islamic family’ as having a mother, a father, and just two children. As Patrick Clawson, an economist at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy points out, the Iran-Iraq war years’ baby boomers are in their 20s, precisely the age of the protestors. In five years, however, the number of 20-somthings is going to decline while the current protestors are going to be in their 30s, and beginning to settle down with young families, their personal priorities elsewhere.

The regime is nervous, though. There is no question that the regime is unpopular across a broad cross-section of society. The evidence for this is not only anecdotal, but also quantitative. Using Persian speakers in Los Angeles, polling companies have surveyed Iranians by taking every telephone exchange in Tehran, and randomizing the last four numbers and conducting what, on the surface is an economic survey but which also provides insight into political altitudes. In September 2007, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps reorganized and implemented what its new commander, Mohammad Ali Jafari, called the mosaic doctrine. Rather than orient the IRGC to defend against foreign armies—as it had been from the days of the Iran-Iraq War—Jafari divided the IRGC into inwardly-oriented units, one for each province and two for Tehran. Jafari argued that internal unrest and the possibility of a velvet revolution posed more of a threat to the regime than foreign armies, a judgment validated by the June 2009 unrest.

The key issue in regime survival therefore lies with the loyalty of the Revolutionary Guards. It matters not if 90% of the Iranian people turn against the regime so long as the IRGC remains loyal to the Supreme Leader. Western politicians can hope for muddle-through reform, but ultimately change will come when the IRGC defects, much like regime change came to Romania after Nikolai Ceausescu’s security forces switched sides. The Iranian regime is aware of this, and so IRGC members are seldom stationed in their home provinces minimizing the risk that units will refuse to fire on crowds which might contain family members, friends, or neighbors.

If the Islamic Republic does not fall, then the regime will have made a Faustian bargain. The IRGC will become a predominant force, dominating not only political life, but also economic and religious life. What we are now seeing is a slow, creeping coup d’état. The Islamic Republic is becoming a military dictatorship, albeit one with a religious patina.

THE FUTURIST: Of all the trends playing in terms of human rights at this moment, from China to Iran to the United States, which ones concern you the most? Which make you the most hopeful?

Michael Rubin: What concerns me most is cultural relativism—the willingness of Western states to accept the arguments of oppressive regimes that Eastern cultures simply do not uphold the same values of individual rights and Western demands that they should is simply new age imperialism. We see this primarily with regard to women and women’s rights.

Communication offers the most hope. From telegram to radio to television to fax to IM and mobile camera and twitter, technology is empowering citizens and preventing human rights abusers from acting with impunity.

THE FUTURIST: Paint us a picture of democracy in the year 2020? What does the word mean? Has the world come to some agreement on it? Is there, on a whole, more of it than existed 10 years ago or less?

Michael Rubin: I’d define democracy not only as representative government accountable to the people, elections contested by political parties who have abandoned militias, and but also a proven record of peaceful transfers of power between government and opposition. I am an optimist and see the spread of democracy is inevitable. I also believe those who argue that certain cultures—Chinese or Arab, for example—are impervious to democracy are wrong. Here, Korea is instructive. Harry S Truman was lambasted for the Korean War and for attempts to bring democracy to South Korea. Critics said that democracy was alien to Korean culture, and it certainly was a process. But today, when we juxtapose North and South Korea, I doubt there are many people who do not believe the price was worth it. Taiwan, too, showed that democracy can thrive in Chinese culture and, while the Iraq war remains a polarizing debate, it is telling that ahead of the March 7 elections, no Iraqi knows who will lead their new government.

About the Interviewee: Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), senior lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School, and lecturer at Johns Hopkins University.

Navigating the Multipolar World: The Free Market vs. State Capitalism, Interview with Ian Bremmer

This interview was conducted by Patrick Tucker, senior editor of THE FUTURIST magazine.

THE FUTURIST: In your new book, The End of the Free Market, you write that human rights and free markets are inextricably linked, yet you perceive a future where many large and profitable state-run corporations exist, advancing neither free-market principles nor human rights. Briefly, was there a particular moment or incident in your travels where you reached this realization?

Ian Bremmer: These tectonic shifts have been under way for a long time. I’ve seen this on the horizon since I started the Eurasia Group. All states are going to become a much bigger driver for global investment. It’s happened more structurally in countries that have state-capitalist systems. Those countries are becoming more important. The eureka moment came several months after the financial crisis first hit. I got a phone call from the protocol office of the Chinese mission in New York. They said the vice minister of foreign affairs, He Yafei, was coming to town. They asked if I would have time to engage in an exchange of views. We got together a small group. I was sitting right across from him, and he said, “Tell me, now that the free market has failed, what do you believe the appropriate role for the state in the global economy should be?” I had to suppress a smile. It was a bold statement.

My response was that, just because the self-regulation of banks proved to be a bad way to run the global economy, does not mean that the absence of the rule of law, or an independent judiciary, or the presence of the state as both principal actor and arbiter of the economy is a better way to run an economy. That was the beginning of a long conversation where we began to engage each other’s worldviews. But the fact of the matter is, on some fundamental philosophical level, these worldviews and systems are incompatible. We in the United States have been able to ignore that, because America has done well in China, and China’s been a very small country (economically speaking). In other words, there’s been a lot of free-riding. It’s now 2010. China is growing at 10% a year and the United States has 10% unemployment. This is going to become a very politicized relationship.

THE FUTURIST: How will people in the United States begin to see that polarization?

Bremmer: Here’s one example: In 2008, as an American voter, you could choose McCain or Obama without any interest or concern as to what their views were in regard to China. That will never happen again.

THE FUTURIST: How does the United States navigate that relationship? What happens to our argument for greater openness in China, greater respect for human rights?

Bremmer: The first thing we have to do is understand that you can’t navigate something without a map. We haven’t had one. There are big problems with the basic narrative that Americans subscribe to about China. Here’s the story we tell ourselves: There’s an authoritarian, communist government on one side and there are people yearning to be free on the other. In that struggle, ultimately, the Chinese people will win; therefore, the United States stands on the side of the Chinese people. We don’t seem to understand that the vast majority of Chinese are exceptionally supportive of their leadership.

Imagine for a moment that there were political reforms put into China right now. They had free and democratic elections. Would the resulting government in China be more beneficial, antithetical, or indifferent to American interests than the government now in place in Beijing? I could make a very strong argument that the resulting Chinese government would be less pro-status quo, more nationalistic, and more problematic to U.S. interests.

THE FUTURIST: You could argue the same thing happened when Hamas won elections in Palestine.

Bremmer: Indeed you could. We tend to fetishize elections in the United States.

THE FUTURIST: What’s the most important thing the U.S. government can do to ensure a better relationship with China, one that’s mutually beneficial?

Bremmer: Be indispensable. We’ve forgotten about this. Many years ago, James Chase wrote about America as the indispensable nation. Today, the United States is in comparative decline vis-à-vis countries like China. I’m not a declinist. But the rise of the rest does mean the comparative decline of the United States. In policy terms, that means we need to focus on the places where we can make them feel that we are indispensable.

1. We have by far the world’s largest military, and it’s essential for humanitarian response after a disaster, such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami that struck Indonesia. The United States has more capability for large-scale coordinated operations because of the size of our military. Hard power becomes more important over time, especially as parts of American soft power, like financial leverage, deteriorate, comparatively speaking.

2. Reiterate our commitment to regulated free markets; that includes being open to Chinese investment in the United States. In 2005, CNOOC — the state-owned Chinese National Offshore Oil Company — made an offer for Unocal [a U.S.-based oil company]. At the time, U.S. lawmakers expressed concern over the Chinese government acquiring a U.S. energy interest. Ultimately, Unocal was sold to Chevron for millions less than the CNOOC offer. Some of the people who really wanted the sale to CNOOC to happen were Unocal management. Chevron already had good managers, but China wanted Unocal managers at CNOOC. More Western management in Chinese firms is insidious; it shows we do this stuff better than they do. They want access to better accounting and more transparency. We have it. This know-how over time makes us more indispensable to China.

3. Most important, we want to avoid protectionism. We don’t want the Chinese to look toward decoupling. That’s a bad scenario. But the argument for globalization will become harder to make politically in the United States, as laid-off workers complain that globalization favors Beijing more than Detroit.

THE FUTURIST: How do you sell globalization to an electorate that’s feeling increasingly pressured by it?

Bremmer: It will become a less popular sell. That’s why you see people arguing in favor of protecting automotive sector jobs even if they aren’t competitive. It’s why the European Union spends 40% of its budget on the farming sector, just 8% of the population. The Europeans just shouldn’t be farming. They should be spending more where they have an advantage.

THE FUTURIST: The United States, too, should focus on its advantages?

Bremmer: Yes, and the United States has huge competitive advantages. A couple of months ago someone asked me, is America even going to be relevant in 10 or 15 years? I told him to ask that question again, but replace “America” with “world’s largest economy.” So, in 10 to 15 years, is the world’s largest economy going to be relevant? The question is farcical. The United States will still, overwhelmingly, be the world’s largest economy and reserve currency.

Research and development throughout the world is U.S.-driven. The world’s best institutions of higher learning are in the United States. It’s harder to get immigration into this country, but scientists are still seeking training here. Who would I bet on to make the next world-changing patents in 20 years for new energy technologies? I’d bet on the United States, of course. If Iwas betting a pool of money, would I bet as much on the United States after 20 years as I would today? No I would not. Would there be a significant shift? Probably yes. But I would still bet on the United States.

Unfortunately, the trajectory is moving in a way that’s more and more uncomfortable. U.S. institutions, which operate well in a steady state or during times of increasing wealth, are terrible at responding to impending crisis. India has been dealing with this same problem for some time, which is why China continually eats their lunch. The kind of system that we have in the United States is decentralized away from the president on key legislative issues; it’s one where individual constituencies win political battles except in the bleakest crises. Given that, it’s very hard for elected political leaders to make globalist arguments publicly. That’s a weakness in the American political system that is structural and will become increasingly apparent as we muddle through these deficit and spending issues.

As a political scientist, I expect that America won’t address these issues proactively; as a consequence, the war between states and corporations will look increasingly combative.

THE FUTURIST: Do you assume the average American voter is incapable of grasping the inherent logic of a globalist perspective?

Bremmer: I would never say “incapable,” but there is a serious collective-action problem. The average American is capable of understanding why voting is important, but what are our voting numbers? As the economic situation, especially from a comparative perspective, becomes tougher, as deficits grow, you’re also going to see much more populism. Some of that will be driven top-down, and a lot of that will be driven by frightened, upset people. It’s a reality. The United States is not well positioned — given all of our priorities on a daily basis — to actually deal with these globalist perspectives. That’s clearly true.

When I talk about these issues, I’m trying not to be ideological about them. The embrace of globalization is how, I am convinced, we will ultimately have the strongest global growth with the most boats rising. But I also understand why it is relatively unlikely to happen. We have to be honest about that.

THE FUTURIST: The year is 2020. Is the average human being — take the aggregate, Russia, China, Iran, western Europe, the United States — more free or less?

Bremmer: A little less, for two reasons. First, the dynamics playing out between the United States and China and within China itself will not have run their course by then. As a consequence, we will increasingly experience an absence of global cohesion and institution making. There will be no sufficient global response to climate change or to proliferation. That creates more volatility and instability, which tends to empower these entrenched authoritarian systems.

The second reason is the increasing risk of the diffusion of dangerous technologies. Rogue states and individuals are more empowered, irrespective of the amount of money going into counterterrorist efforts. It doesn’t take teams of people to take down planes anymore but one sufficiently motivated individual, and not just planes but other targets with real-time market implications. That’s going to have an impact on individual liberties.

The combination of those two things, the dangerous technology growth and the tectonics of an increasingly non-polar world, will affect the spread of freedom and democracy. The fight between free but regulated markets against state capitalism will result in swings in that direction.

THE FUTURIST: On the most micro-level, what can a reader of THE FUTURIST do to improve that situation?

Bremmer: I focused just now on the massive decentralization of dangerous technologies. The flipside of that coin is the decentralization of empowering technologies. The most significant of those is the Internet, the blogosphere, and communications networks. We’re living in an increasingly content-rich environment. Some of that content is dangerous, but more of it is benign.

We’re also living in a world where really interesting and valid content becomes more important even if it comes from people who have not been anointed by the powers that be. The average insightful reader with something intelligent to say can contribute ideas and criticism in a way that has actual and meaningful potential to affect the way political, civic, and economic leaders think and act, and in a way that 10 or 20 years ago was unimaginable.

About the Interviewee

Ian Bremmer is an American political scientist specializing in U.S. foreign policy, states in transition, and global political risk. He is the president and founder of Eurasia Group, a global political risk research and consulting firm providing financial, corporate, and government clients with insight on how political developments move markets. His latest book, The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations? will be released by Portfolio in May 2010.

Writing for Rights: An Interview with Iranian Dissident Azar Nafisi

THE FUTURIST: You are regarded as a proponent both of women’s rights in the Muslim world and of Westernization. How have recent events changed your views of the influence of Western culture in Iran? On the one hand, there is evidence that students in Iran were using mobile technology to organize protests following the 2009 Iranian presidential election. (Most of the people “tweeting” about it, however, were from the United States.) On the other hand, the Iranian government has used that same technology against protesters. Does mobile tech like cell phones and the Internet make the fight against authoritarianism easier or more difficult? What are the pitfalls?

Azar Nafisi: You see the adverse effects of technology in America itself. It’s become a challenge to turn information into real knowledge. The United States is becoming a superficial culture. But right now, inside Iran and other repressive countries, this technology is far more advantageous to the people than to governments. The Internet and cell phones are allowing the Iranian people to connect to the world through human-rights sites where texts about democracy are available. These texts are read and translated widely in Iran. I’ve connected with hundreds of Iranian students to learn about what’s actually going on there. A similar phenomenon is playing out in China. But the continuance of this progress requires the help of companies like Google and Yahoo.

THE FUTURIST: Looking more broadly, the current tension between the United States and Iran has become a dispute over technology — does Iran have the right to the same nuclear weapons capability that the United States has possessed for more than 60 years? Isn’t it hypocritical for the West to claim it’s seeking to aid the cause of progress when it is literally standing in the way of knowledge sharing on this issue?

Nafisi: Don’t get me started criticizing the problems of Western U.S. foreign policy; this isn’t among my criticisms. We should put our efforts into taking these weapons out of the hands of all countries, whether Pakistan, Iran, or North Korea. Yes, Ahmadinejad mentions this supposed double standard, and nuclear weapons are dangerous in America’s hands, just as they are in anyone’s. But the United States is far more open and democratic than is Iran. The system in the United States is more reliable. The government is more accountable than that of the Iranian regime. I can trust it more. But I don’t feel good about America or any other country having nuclear weapons.

THE FUTURIST: You’ve said: “At the beginning of the [Iranian] Revolution, not only the Islamists but also the radical left were all very set in what they wanted and the way they saw the world. As the revolution progressed, two things happened to the young Islamists. One was that the Islamic Republic failed to live up to any of its claims. Apart from oppressing people and changing the laws, and lowering the age of marriage from 18 to nine, [the Islamic government] did not accomplish anything economically, socially, politically, or in terms of security.” Today, as part of the so-called Green Revolution, thousands of Iranians are directly challenging the results of the latest presidential election. Do you think the Green Revolution’s aims are more realistic? Do today’s rebels stand a greater chance of success? And what’s the most important thing the 1979 revolution has to teach the Iranian rebels of today?

Nafisi: I was one of those starry-eyed optimists as well. But the new movement is mature. The Iranian people have paid a very high price for the mistakes of 1979. The most important lesson: If you’re going to join a revolution, you have to have as clear an idea of what sort of government you do want as what you don’t want.

The second lesson they appear to have learned is that democratic ends should be achieved through democratic means. The government won’t allow it. I have hope, but I’m not overly optimistic. The government is savage and terrified. The political leaders who would favor democracy, both in Iran and abroad, are now followers of the new movement, whose strength comes from the spontaneous actions of the people themselves. It’s truly a grassroots phenomenon.

What does this show? That Iran has a strong civil tradition. But there are times you need leadership and strategy. I expect the government will continue to kill and jail anyone who comes to the front.

THE FUTURIST: In your new memoir, Things I’ve Been Silent About, you write: “Looking back at our history, what seems surprising to me is not how powerful religious authorities have been in Iran, but how quickly modern secular ways took over a society so deeply dominated by religious orthodoxy and political absolutism.” Why do you think that was, and what does it say about the potential spread of Western ideals and Western notions of democracy in Iran and throughout the Muslim world?

Nafisi: Iran has a unique history; it goes back 3,000 years to the beginning of Zoroastrianism. Even now, the Islam practiced today in Iran is mixed and mingled with pre-Islamic traditions. The Iranian New Year is celebrated on the first of March; the names in the calendar are Zoroastrian deities. We are a multicultural society, with different religions, different traditions, living side by side. This provides the flexibility the country needs to accept the new.

So many people think changes and modernization in Iran just came from the West. I think the old system of monarchy just stopped working. The time of Western ideas coincided with a period of crisis. At the start of the last century, Iranians were bringing novels and theater back to Iran, but they were also boycotting foreign goods and fighting British imperialism. The history of the West in Iran is one of cultural and economic exploitation.

On the other hand, you have a close relationship culturally. This persists. The most important political leaders of Iran in the twentieth century were secular. And the most important of these was Mohammad Mosaddeq. The Ayatollah Khomeini hated him as much as he hated the Shah. Mosaddeq was religious but secular in governance, and his influence remains considerable.

When you talk about genuine, multiculturalism, you need a political and civil system that extends rights to all. You see that in the United States itself. There are people who think the country is Christian in nature, but this is a stagnant view. The Founding Fathers were Christian — they mention God — but without freedom of religion, no country can claim to be multicultural.

THE FUTURIST: What do you see as the likely future of Iranian–U.S. relations? What future would you like to see?

Nafisi: The problem lies with both sides. It’s to the advantage of the United States to have full diplomatic relations, but it’s not in the regime’s interests to make peace. The regime sees U.S. culture as the most dangerous weapon. An embassy in Iran, with people lining up to apply for visas, doesn’t help them maintain power. But the United States has been tactical and simplistic in its approach. It’s reduced its perception of Iran to the regime.

The United States has vacillated. I think the correct policy is pursuing dialogue with the regime, but also creating a dialogue with the Iranian people.

My ideal future is one that features genuine interaction and dialogue well beyond the government level. The problem is that connections right now aren’t through personal contacts but through governments. If people in the United States became more concerned with the human rights of the Iranian people, this would be a positive step. I’ve been looking for ways to create a connection between the two peoples. I do this through my books and through my teaching. I was first introduced to America by Huck Finn. I want people to come to Iran through Firdausi, a poet. Perhaps I can help with this. Art and literature should not be bound by nationality.

THE FUTURIST: Paint us a picture of the year 2020.

Nafisi: I hope that developments in technology, particularly visual and virtual reality, will bring us closer together. Imagine people across countries and continents “walking” into each other’s homes thousands of miles away. If we can create this experience through technology, the world will become a better place. I’m terrified of a future where we use gadgets, devices, and little amusements to shut ourselves in, to isolate ourselves. But new technology can actually serve the cause of empathy. If a girl is shot in the street in Iran during a protest, and a girl across the world can see it — can put herself in the place of her comrade across the sea — a tragedy becomes a victory for humanity. ❑

About the Interviewee

Azar Nafisi is the author of Reading Lolita in Tehran (Random House, 2008) and Things I’ve Been Silent About (Random House, 2008). She is a visiting fellow and lecturer at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, www.sais-jhu.edu.

This interview was conducted by Patrick Tucker, senior editor of THE FUTURIST magazine.