In your article, you talk about what a bio-weapons
attack might look like and which pathogens might
lend themselves to weaponization. Has your view
changed or evolved?
Kellman: I wanted to project a general perspective. My views have evolved slightly. Right now, I’d say that the primary threat agent is anthrax. This is based on the opinions of the U.S. intelligence community; I’m not really equipped to give an independent judgment other than to say that their reasoning strikes me as grounded in a far deeper understanding than I have about the inclinations of major terror organizations.
Smallpox is often mentioned as a key threat. I don’t believe terror organizations are equipped, or likely, to synthesize smallpox at this time, though this danger will grow. In the article, I highlighted influenza’s dangers and I would restate that concern. I also think, in discussing the threat of bio-weapons, it’s very important to strive for the right tone and be ever-vigilant against inciting alarm unnecessarily.
THE FUTURIST: What are the three most important steps the government should undertake to prevent a bio-terror attack?
2. Develop Global policies
3. Develop Worldwide policies
OK, so the list above is just to emphasize the point: there’s an enormous amount that the United States is doing right now at the domestic level that could measurably augment security if expanded internationally.
Generally stated, we should:
1. Develop a Global Biothreat Reduction Initiative that would systematically tighten controls on lethal pathogens, increase security at bio-laboratories, and advance capabilities for tracking and maintaining records concerning the movement of potentially dangerous capabilities.
2. Strengthen national and trans-national capacities to detect and interrupt bioterror preparations by enhancing implementation of comprehensive national legislation (pursuant to UNSCR 1540), training and equipping police, encouraging cooperation between law enforcers and other officials (e.g. public health), and developing modalities for conducting trans-national investigations of suspicious activities associated with bio.
3. Enhance global preparedness for bio-attacks. Preparedness includes hardening targets (e.g., locking air circulation systems of major venues), improving biosurveillance and disease diagnosis, facilitating global development of countermeasures, and establishing a platform for rapid global delivery of vaccines/antidotes.
FUTURIST: Do you believe a bio-terror on
the U.S. will occur between now and 2013? What makes
you think this?
Kellman: I think it’s nonsensical to assign a particular year. Obviously, the greater the time span, the more likely the danger, but there’s no reason to agree or disagree with 2013.
A few points are worth highlighting:
First, the risks of a bioviolence attack increase with time as technological advance facilitates new modes of attack.
Second, at the current slow pace of policy development, the disparity between dangers and safeguards will widen appreciably over the next decade, likely sooner.
Lastly, the limiting phrase “on the U.S.” is inappropriate because a catastrophic attack anywhere in the world (especially involving contagion) will be horrifying for the United States.
Interview conducted by Patrick Tucker, senior editor of THE FUTURIST magazine. Barry Kellman is the director of the International Weapons Control Center at the DePaul University College of Law, He is the author of Bioviolence —Preventing Biological Terror and Crime (Cambridge University Press, 2007) and a WorldFuture 2009 speaker. WorldFuture 2009 will be held July-17-19 at the Hilton Chicago. Registration for WorldFuture 2009 is open.